فترة خلو الحكم (شرق الأردن)

فترة خلو الحكم في شرق الأردن، وهي التي أعقبت الحرب الفرنسية-السورية في 25 يوليو 1920 حتى تأسيس إمارة شرق الأردن في 11 أبريل 1921.[1] أصبح شرق الأردن خلالها أرضًا خالية من الحكم[2] أو كما وصفها السير هربرت صموئيل، «تركت مهجورة سياسيًا»[3][4] كانت المنطقة فقيرة للغاية، وقليلة السكان واعتبرت على نطاق واسع غير قابلة للسيطرة.[5]

تجنب البريطانيون في انتدابية فلسطين المجاورة «وضع أي صلة بين هذه الأراضي وفلسطين» وطوروا ما اصطلح على تسميته «السياسة الشريفية» لحكمها.[6] في ظل محاولات الصهاينة ضمها إلى مشروعهم. حيث جابه وزير الخارجية البريطاني اللورد كرزون طموحات المفوض السامي في فلسطين الصهيوني هربرت صموئيل لتحقيق ذلك.[7][8][9][10]

قرار بريطانيا التخلي عن الاحتلال المباشر

لقاء هربرت صموئيل مع الأهالي في السلط، في 21 أغسطس 1920 في فناء كنيسة السيدة العذراء الكاثوليكية. حذر كرزون صموئيل بعد ذلك ببضعة أيام: «يجب ألا يكون عندك أي شك في نية بريطانيا إنشاء إدارة مستبقلة هناك».[7][11][12]

تطوير السياسة

في أوائل عام 1920، ظهر مبدآن داخل الحكومة البريطانية مع بدايات عام 1920، الأول هو أن حكومة فلسطين لن تسيطر على شرق الأردن، والثاني هو أن بريطانيا اختارت -وإن كان محل خلاف- أن يكون الأردن ضمن كيان عربي مستقل تفسيرًا لمراسالات الحسين - مكماهون عام 1915.[7][arabic-abajed 1]

أراد البريطانيون تحديد منطقة النفوذ الفرنسي في سوريا وفقًا لصك الانتداب وهل تشمل شرق الأردن أم لا[arabic-abajed 2]، لكنهم في النهاية متمثلين بشخص وزير الخارجية كرزون قرروا أن شرق الأردن سيبقى مستقلًا ولكن بعلاقة أقرب مع فلسطين منها مع مناطق نفوذ الفرنسيين في الشمال.[arabic-abajed 3]

الاطماع الصهيونية في شرق الأردن

بعث وزير الخارجية البريطاني كرزون في 6 أغسطس 1920 رسالة إلى المندوب السامي المعين حديثًا في فلسطين، هربرت صموئيل قال فيها: «عليك أن تدرك فورًا أننا لن نعترف بأي نفوذ فرنسي جنوب خط اتفاقية سايكس بيكو، وأن ترتيباتنا لهذه المنطقة تقتضي أن تكون مستقلة وبعلاقة وثيقة جدًا مع فلسطين».[9][12] رد عليه صموئيل بقوله: «إن شيوخ القبائل شرقي الأردن غير راضين عن الأشراف بعد سقوط حكومتهم في دمشق، وليس مرجحًا أن يقبلوا إحياءها».[9][12] كما طلب ضم أجزاء من شرق الأردن لسيطرته الإدارية.[arabic-abajed 4]

بعد أسبوعين من ذلك في 21 أغسطس زار هربرت صموئيل شرق الأردن دون إذن من لندن؛ واجتمع مع 600 شخصية قيادية في السلط، وأعلن استقلال المنطقة عن دمشق واستيعابها في انتدابية فلسطين، وهي التي تمثل أربعة أضعاف مساحتها وذلك عن طريق الاستسلام الضمني. وقد أكد صموئيل للأهالي في شرق الأردن أن بلادهم لن تدمج تمامًا مع فلسطين.[9][arabic-abajed 5] رفض كرزون هذه الإجراءات فورًا وبعث في 26 أغسطس رسالة واضحة لصموئيل أن هذه المنطقة «تنوي بريطانيا وبلا أدنى شك إنشاء حكومة مستقلة فيها» وذلك تجنبًا لتخصيص موارد كبيرة لمنطقة تعتبر ذات قيمة إستراتيجية هامشية[8] نزولًا عند الرغبة الحكومية بتخفيض النفقات العسكرية البريطانية، وقد أصدر كرزون تعليمات إلى الدبلوماسي البريطاني فانسيترات بمغادرة الحدود الشرقية لفلسطين دون تحديد- وتجنب إيجاد أي صلة بينها وبين فلسطين؛ لترك المجال مفتوحًا لإنشاء حكومة عربية هناك.[7][arabic-abajed 6][arabic-abajed 7]

في فبراير 1921 قال كرزون: «أنا قلق للغاية على شرق الأردن... إن السيد هـ. صموئيل يريده متاحًا لليهود كملحق لفلسطين. أنا هنا لمنع ذلك».[7]

الحكومات المحلية

أرسلت الحكومة البريطانية بعد خطاب صموئيل في أغسطس 1920، ستة موظفين سياسيين صغارًا إلى البلاد لتشجيع إنشاء حكومات محلية مستقلة ولتقديم المشورة؛ لم يُقدم أي دعم عسكري، ومُنح الأهالي دعمًا ماديًّا محدودًا، وكان بعض الضباط لا يتحدثون العربية.[23] استمر هذا الحال حتى أبريل 1921، على الرغم من أن البريطانيين كانوا قد استنتجوا بحلول فبراير 1921 أن «نفوذ الأمير عبد الله قد حل بالكامل محل تأثير الحكومات المحلية والمستشارين البريطانيين في سائر مناطق شرق الأردن».[24] كانت الحكومات المحلية التي تأسست خلال هذه الفترة هي:

منطقة عجلون

عين الرائد فيتزي سومرست (FitzRoy Somerset والنقيب ريجينالد مونكطون Reginald Monckton مسؤولين سياسيين.[25][26] كانت عجلون المنطقة الأكثر كثافة سكانية في البلاد[25] وقُسِّمت لاحقًا إلى أربع حكومات: جبل عجلون، والكورة، وإربد، وجرش.[26] ترأس حكومة جرش المحلية محمد علي المغربي.[27]

منطقة البلقاء

في منطقة البلقاء:

السلط

عُيِّن الرائد ج.ن. كامب J.N. Camp والنقيب Chisholm Dunbar Brunton هما مسؤولين سياسيين.[25] سُلِّمت لاحقًا للنقيب Frederick Peake، الذي تولى قوات الدرك.[26][25]

عمّان

عُيِّن الكابتن آلان كيركبرايد (شقيق أليك الأصغر) مسؤولًا سياسيًّا.[26]

منطقة الكرك

عُيِّن الكابتن أليك كيركبرايد مسؤولًا سياسيًّا.[25] وأطلق عليها اسم حكومة موآب الوطنية".[28] وكانت أنجح الحكومات.[26]

ملاحظات

Paris writes: "Of course, the uncertainty surrounding Transjordan's status pre-dated Abdullah's appearance on the scene. While it had long been clear that British control of the area south of the Sykes-Picot line and extending from Palestine to Persia would be divided into two political regions, the Palestine and Mesopotamian Mandates were assumed to be coterminous: no provision was made for any intervening territory. Whether it was part of Palestine or Mesopotamia, however, there was never any doubt that Transjordan would come under the British Mandate. But recognition of that fact did not resolve the status of Transjordan vis-à-vis its neighbours in any definitive way. Moreover, two principles that emerged in 1920 and were calculated to further define the nature of the new state, served only to further confuse matters and to generate the uncertainty of which Abdullah, Samuel and Philby later complained. The first was that the administrative authority of the Palestine government would not be extended east of the Jordan, a principle laid down as early as July 1920. The second sprang from Young's interpretation of the 'McMahon pledge'. Since McMahon had excluded from the area of promised Arab independence territory lying west of the 'district of Damascus', he argued that in areas to the east of that district—that is, east of the River Jordan—Britain was obligated to 'recognise and support' such independence. The interpretation seemed logical enough to those who had not examined carefully the text of McMahon's letters…"[13]
Hubert Young to Ambassador Hardinge (Paris), 27 July 1920, FO 371/5254, cited by Wilson.[14]
Wilson writes: "Since the end of the war the territory north of Ma'an had been ruled by Damascus as a province of Faysal's Kingdom of Syria. Although it fell within the British zone according to the Sykes-Picot agreement, Britain was content with the arrangement because it favoured Arab rule in the interior and Faysal was, after all, British protege. However, when France occupied Damascus the picture changed dramatically. Britain did not want to see France extend its control southward to the borders of Palestine and closer to the Suez Canal ... It suddenly became important to know 'what is the "Syria" for which the French received a mandate at San Remo?' and 'does it include Transjordania?' ... The British foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, decided that it did not and that Britain henceforth would regard the area as independent, but in 'closest relation' with Palestine."[14]
Sicker wrote: "On August 7, 1920, Herbert Samuel, the recently appointed high commissioner in Palestine, cabled London requesting permission to include Trans-Jordan directly under his administrative control, thereby allowing him to take the necessary steps to restore order in the territory. This would eliminate the threat of a French attempt to control the region from Damascus."[15]
Wilson writes: "Samuel then organised a meeting of Transjordanian leaders at Salt on 21 August, at which he would announce British plans... On 20 August Samuel and a few political officers left Jerusalem by car, headed for the Jordan river, the frontier of British territory at that time. 'It is an entirely irregular proceeding,' he noted, 'my going outside my own jurisdiction into a country which was Faisal's, and is still being administered by the Damascus Government, now under French influence. But it is equally irregular for a government under French influence to be exercising functions in territory which is agreed to be within the British sphere: and of the two irregularities I prefer mine.'... The meeting, held in the courtyard of the Catholic church, was attended by about 600 people ... Sentence by sentence his speech describing British policy was translated into Arabic: political officers would be stationed in towns to help organise local governments; Transjordan would not come under Palestinian administration; there would be no conscription and no disarmament ... On balance, Samuel's statement of policy was unobjectionable. Three things feared by the Arabs of Transjordan – conscription, disarmament, and annexation by Palestine – were abjured ... The presence of a few British agents, unsupported by troops, seemed a small concession in return for the protection Britain's presence would afford against the French, who, it was feared, might press their occupation southward ... Samuel returned to Jerusalem well pleased with the success of his mission. He left behind several officers to see to the administration of Transjordan and the maintenance of British influence."[16]
Curzon's 26 August 1920 telegram stated that: "His Majesty's Government have no desire to extend their responsibilities in Arab districts and must insist on strict adherence to the very limited assistance which we can offer to a native administration in Trans-jordania as stated in my telegram No. 80 of August 11th. There must be no question of setting up any British administration in that area and all that may be done at present is to send a maximum of four or five political officers with instructions on the lines laid down in my above mentioned telegram." [17][18][19]
Curzon wrote: "His Majesty's Government are already treating 'Trans-Jordania' as separate from the Damascus State, while at the same time avoiding any definite connection between it and Palestine, thus leaving the way open for the establishment there, should it become advisable, of some form of independent Arab government, perhaps by arrangement with King Hussein or other Arab chiefs concerned."[20][21][22]

المراجع

Dann, U. (1969). The Beginnings of the Arab Legion. Middle Eastern Studies,5(3), 181-191. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282290 نسخة محفوظة 2019-06-07 على موقع واي باك مشين. "...the interregnum between Faysal's departure from Syria and 'Abdallah's installation at 'Amman."
نورمان بنتويتش, England in Palestine, p51, "The High Commissioner had ... only been in office a few days when Emir Faisal ... had to flee his kingdom" and "The departure of Faisal and the breaking up of the Emirate of Syria left the territory on the east side of Jordan in a puzzling state of detachment. It was for a time no-man's-land. In the Ottoman regime the territory was attached to the Vilayet of Damascus; under the Military Administration it had been treated a part of the eastern occupied territory which was governed from Damascus; but it was now impossible that that subordination should continue, and its natural attachment was with Palestine. The territory was, indeed, included in the Mandated territory of Palestine, but difficult issues were involved as to application there of the clauses of the Mandate concerning the Jewish National Home. The undertakings given to the Arabs as to the autonomous Arab region included the territory. Lastly, His Majesty's Government were unwilling to embark on any definite commitment, and vetoed any entry into the territory by the troops. The Arabs were therefore left to work out their destiny."
Pipes، Daniel (26 مارس 1992). Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. Oxford University Press. ص. 28–. ISBN:978-0-19-536304-3. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2017-10-19.
Edward W. Said؛ Christopher Hitchens (2001). Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question. Verso. ص. 197–. ISBN:978-1-85984-340-6. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2016-06-29.
Salibi 1998.
Lord Curzon in August 1921: "His Majesty's Government are already treating 'Trans-Jordania' as separate from the Damascus State, while at the same time avoiding any definite connection between it and Palestine, thus leaving the way open for the establishment there, should it become advisable, of some form of independent Arab government, perhaps by arrangement with King Hussein or other Arab chiefs concerned.": quote from: Empires of the sand: the struggle for mastery in the Middle East, 1789–1923, By Efraim Karsh, Inari Karsh نسخة محفوظة 2017-02-22 على موقع واي باك مشين.
Paris 2003.
Sicker 1999.
Aruri 1972.
Wilson 1990.
Friedman 2011.
Woodward 1963.
Paris 2003، صفحة 202–203.
Wilson 1990، صفحة 44.
Sicker 1999، صفحات 158.
Wilson 1990، صفحة 46–48.
Friedman 2011، صفحة 325.
Woodward 1963، صفحة 344.
Alsberg 1973، صفحة 235.
Karsh & Karsh 2001، صفحة 317.
Woodward 1963، صفحة 351.
Alsberg 1973، صفحة 236.
Alon 2009.
Rudd 1993.
Alon 2007.
Rogan 2002.
"رئاسة الوزراء - عن الاردن". www.pm.gov.jo. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-04-10.
Roger Hardy (8 مارس 2018). The Poisoned Well: Empire and Its Legacy in the Middle East. Oxford University Press. ص. 89–. ISBN:978-1-84904-954-2. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-02-27.

قائمة المراجع

Bradshaw، Tancred (30 مارس 2012). Britain and Jordan: Imperial Strategy, King Abdullah I and the Zionist Movement. I.B.Tauris. ISBN:978-0-85772-114-3. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-04-23.
Salibi، Kamal S. (1998). The Modern History of Jordan. London: I B Tauris. ISBN:978-1860643316.
Paris، Timothy J. (2003). Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule: The Sherifian Solution. Routledge. ISBN:978-1-135-77191-1. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-12-22.
Sicker، Martin (1999). Reshaping Palestine: From Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate, 1831–1922. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN:978-0-275-96639-3. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2017-10-11.
Wasserstein، Bernard (2008). Israel and Palestine: Why They Fight and Can They Stop?. Profile Books. ISBN:978-1-84668-092-2. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-12-20.
Wilson، Mary Christina (1990). King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan. Cambridge University Press. ISBN:978-0-521-39987-6. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-12-22.
Woodward، Ernest Llewellyn (1963). Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, First series, Volume XIII. H.M. Stationery Office. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-12-24.
Alsberg، Paul Avraham [بالألمانية] (1973). "קביעת הגבול המזרחי של ארץ ישראל (Determining the Eastern Boundary of the Land of Israel)". في Daniel Carpi (المحرر). הציונות: מאסף לתולדות התנועה הציונית והישוב היהודי בארץ־ישראל. וניברסיטת תל-אביב, הוצאת הכבוץ המיוחד. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-12-21. available in pdf here {{استشهاد بكتاب}}: روابط خارجية في |اقتباس= (مساعدة)
- Alsberg، Avraham P. [بالألمانية] (1980). "Delimitation of the eastern border of Palestine". Zionism. Institute for Zionist Research Founded in Memory of Chaim Weizmann. ج. 2. ص. 87–98. DOI:10.1080/13531048108575800. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-12-25. {{استشهاد بكتاب}}: |عمل= تُجوهل (مساعدة)
Aruri، Naseer Hasan (1972). Jordan: A Study in Political Development 1923–1965. The Hague: دار بريل للنشر. ISBN:978-90-247-1217-5. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-11-29. اطلع عليه بتاريخ 2009-05-02.{{استشهاد بكتاب}}: صيانة الاستشهاد: ref duplicates default (link)
Karsh، Efraim؛ Karsh، Inari (2001). Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789–1923. Harvard University Press. ISBN:978-0-674-00541-9. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-04-23.
Friedman، Isaiah (2011). British Pan-Arab Policy, 1915–1922. Transaction Publishers. ISBN:978-1-4128-1514-7. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-04-23.
Alon، Yoav (2009). "'Heart-Beguiling Araby' on the Frontier of Empire: Early Anglo-Arab Relations in Transjordan". British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. ج. 36 ع. 1: 55–72. DOI:10.1080/13530190902749580. JSTOR:40593218.
Rogan، Eugene L. (11 أبريل 2002). Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850-1921. Cambridge University Press. ISBN:978-0-521-89223-0. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2017-10-18.
Alon، Yoav (30 مارس 2007). The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State. I.B.Tauris. ISBN:978-1-84511-138-0. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-04-23.

بوابة الأردن
بوابة عقد 1920

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[14] Paris writes: "Of course, the uncertainty surrounding Transjordan's status pre-dated Abdullah's appearance on the scene. While it had long been clear that British control of the area south of the Sykes-Picot line and extending from Palestine to Persia would be divided into two political regions, the Palestine and Mesopotamian Mandates were assumed to be coterminous: no provision was made for any intervening territory. Whether it was part of Palestine or Mesopotamia, however, there was never any doubt that Transjordan would come under the British Mandate. But recognition of that fact did not resolve the status of Transjordan vis-à-vis its neighbours in any definitive way. Moreover, two principles that emerged in 1920 and were calculated to further define the nature of the new state, served only to further confuse matters and to generate the uncertainty of which Abdullah, Samuel and Philby later complained. The first was that the administrative authority of the Palestine government would not be extended east of the Jordan, a principle laid down as early as July 1920. The second sprang from Young's interpretation of the 'McMahon pledge'. Since McMahon had excluded from the area of promised Arab independence territory lying west of the 'district of Damascus', he argued that in areas to the east of that district—that is, east of the River Jordan—Britain was obligated to 'recognise and support' such independence. The interpretation seemed logical enough to those who had not examined carefully the text of McMahon's letters…"[13]

[16] Hubert Young to Ambassador Hardinge (Paris), 27 July 1920, FO 371/5254, cited by Wilson.[14]

[17] Wilson writes: "Since the end of the war the territory north of Ma'an had been ruled by Damascus as a province of Faysal's Kingdom of Syria. Although it fell within the British zone according to the Sykes-Picot agreement, Britain was content with the arrangement because it favoured Arab rule in the interior and Faysal was, after all, British protege. However, when France occupied Damascus the picture changed dramatically. Britain did not want to see France extend its control southward to the borders of Palestine and closer to the Suez Canal ... It suddenly became important to know 'what is the "Syria" for which the French received a mandate at San Remo?' and 'does it include Transjordania?' ... The British foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, decided that it did not and that Britain henceforth would regard the area as independent, but in 'closest relation' with Palestine."[14]

[19] Sicker wrote: "On August 7, 1920, Herbert Samuel, the recently appointed high commissioner in Palestine, cabled London requesting permission to include Trans-Jordan directly under his administrative control, thereby allowing him to take the necessary steps to restore order in the territory. This would eliminate the threat of a French attempt to control the region from Damascus."[15]

[21] Wilson writes: "Samuel then organised a meeting of Transjordanian leaders at Salt on 21 August, at which he would announce British plans... On 20 August Samuel and a few political officers left Jerusalem by car, headed for the Jordan river, the frontier of British territory at that time. 'It is an entirely irregular proceeding,' he noted, 'my going outside my own jurisdiction into a country which was Faisal's, and is still being administered by the Damascus Government, now under French influence. But it is equally irregular for a government under French influence to be exercising functions in territory which is agreed to be within the British sphere: and of the two irregularities I prefer mine.'... The meeting, held in the courtyard of the Catholic church, was attended by about 600 people ... Sentence by sentence his speech describing British policy was translated into Arabic: political officers would be stationed in towns to help organise local governments; Transjordan would not come under Palestinian administration; there would be no conscription and no disarmament ... On balance, Samuel's statement of policy was unobjectionable. Three things feared by the Arabs of Transjordan – conscription, disarmament, and annexation by Palestine – were abjured ... The presence of a few British agents, unsupported by troops, seemed a small concession in return for the protection Britain's presence would afford against the French, who, it was feared, might press their occupation southward ... Samuel returned to Jerusalem well pleased with the success of his mission. He left behind several officers to see to the administration of Transjordan and the maintenance of British influence."[16]

[25] Curzon's 26 August 1920 telegram stated that: "His Majesty's Government have no desire to extend their responsibilities in Arab districts and must insist on strict adherence to the very limited assistance which we can offer to a native administration in Trans-jordania as stated in my telegram No. 80 of August 11th. There must be no question of setting up any British administration in that area and all that may be done at present is to send a maximum of four or five political officers with instructions on the lines laid down in my above mentioned telegram." [17][18][19]

[29] Curzon wrote: "His Majesty's Government are already treating 'Trans-Jordania' as separate from the Damascus State, while at the same time avoiding any definite connection between it and Palestine, thus leaving the way open for the establishment there, should it become advisable, of some form of independent Arab government, perhaps by arrangement with King Hussein or other Arab chiefs concerned."[20][21][22]

[1] Dann, U. (1969). The Beginnings of the Arab Legion. Middle Eastern Studies,5(3), 181-191. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4282290 نسخة محفوظة 2019-06-07 على موقع واي باك مشين. "...the interregnum between Faysal's departure from Syria and 'Abdallah's installation at 'Amman."

[Bentwich-2] نورمان بنتويتش, England in Palestine, p51, "The High Commissioner had ... only been in office a few days when Emir Faisal ... had to flee his kingdom" and "The departure of Faisal and the breaking up of the Emirate of Syria left the territory on the east side of Jordan in a puzzling state of detachment. It was for a time no-man's-land. In the Ottoman regime the territory was attached to the Vilayet of Damascus; under the Military Administration it had been treated a part of the eastern occupied territory which was governed from Damascus; but it was now impossible that that subordination should continue, and its natural attachment was with Palestine. The territory was, indeed, included in the Mandated territory of Palestine, but difficult issues were involved as to application there of the clauses of the Mandate concerning the Jewish National Home. The undertakings given to the Arabs as to the autonomous Arab region included the territory. Lastly, His Majesty's Government were unwilling to embark on any definite commitment, and vetoed any entry into the territory by the troops. The Arabs were therefore left to work out their destiny."

[3] Pipes، Daniel (26 مارس 1992). Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition. Oxford University Press. ص. 28–. ISBN:978-0-19-536304-3. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2017-10-19.

[4] Edward W. Said؛ Christopher Hitchens (2001). Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question. Verso. ص. 197–. ISBN:978-1-85984-340-6. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2016-06-29.

[FOOTNOTESalibi1998-5] Salibi 1998.

[6] Lord Curzon in August 1921: "His Majesty's Government are already treating 'Trans-Jordania' as separate from the Damascus State, while at the same time avoiding any definite connection between it and Palestine, thus leaving the way open for the establishment there, should it become advisable, of some form of independent Arab government, perhaps by arrangement with King Hussein or other Arab chiefs concerned.": quote from: Empires of the sand: the struggle for mastery in the Middle East, 1789–1923, By Efraim Karsh, Inari Karsh نسخة محفوظة 2017-02-22 على موقع واي باك مشين.

[FOOTNOTEParis2003-7] Paris 2003.

[FOOTNOTESicker1999-8] Sicker 1999.

[FOOTNOTEAruri1972-9] Aruri 1972.

[FOOTNOTEWilson1990-10] Wilson 1990.

[FOOTNOTEFriedman2011-11] Friedman 2011.

[FOOTNOTEWoodward1963-12] Woodward 1963.

[FOOTNOTEParis2003202–203-13] Paris 2003، صفحة 202–203.

[FOOTNOTEWilson199044-15] Wilson 1990، صفحة 44.

[FOOTNOTESicker1999158-18] Sicker 1999، صفحات 158.

[FOOTNOTEWilson199046–48-20] Wilson 1990، صفحة 46–48.

[FOOTNOTEFriedman2011325-22] Friedman 2011، صفحة 325.

[FOOTNOTEWoodward1963344-23] Woodward 1963، صفحة 344.

[FOOTNOTEAlsberg1973235-24] Alsberg 1973، صفحة 235.

[FOOTNOTEKarshKarsh2001317-26] Karsh & Karsh 2001، صفحة 317.

[FOOTNOTEWoodward1963351-27] Woodward 1963، صفحة 351.

[FOOTNOTEAlsberg1973236-28] Alsberg 1973، صفحة 236.

[FOOTNOTEAlon2009-30] Alon 2009.

[FOOTNOTERudd1993-31] Rudd 1993.

[FOOTNOTEAlon2007-32] Alon 2007.

[FOOTNOTERogan2002-33] Rogan 2002.

[34] "رئاسة الوزراء - عن الاردن". www.pm.gov.jo. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2019-04-10.

[Hardy2018-35] Roger Hardy (8 مارس 2018). The Poisoned Well: Empire and Its Legacy in the Middle East. Oxford University Press. ص. 89–. ISBN:978-1-84904-954-2. مؤرشف من الأصل في 2020-02-27.